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As information becomes a more predominant tool of contemporary warfare, Central 
and Eastern Europe serve on the front line of information operations originating from the 
Kremlin. Though the use of propaganda is not a new phenomenon for the Russian 
government, the evolution of information warfare has become more potent than ever. 
Current research identifies many aspects of Russian active measures throughout Central 
and Eastern Europe. Although Moldova is considered part of Eastern Europe, less 
Western academic research focuses specifically on the case of Moldova compared to 
countries like Romania and Ukraine. More scholarly attention is required to characterize 
Moldova’s relation to the broader Eastern European region. This study examines 
Moldova through a within case study and compares how Russian master narratives 
present throughout Central and Eastern Europe fit in Moldova using content analysis of 
internet-based news articles. The study finds that the broader master narratives of Central 
and Eastern Europe apply to Moldova with minor exceptions. Not only does the study 
contribute to a lack of focused research on Moldova but also helps to validate the Center 
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As a result of the widening rift between Russia and the West, post-Soviet 
republics located in the buffer area between NATO and Russia face the difficult 
challenge of navigating relationships with two main orientations at odds with one 
another. Europe and the United States commonly referred to as the West, seek Moldova’s 
development tied to Western democratic and capitalistic norms while Russia desires to 
return Moldova firmly into its own sphere of influence. Economic opportunities, political 
ideology, and cultural heritage all weigh heavily on the overall orientation of post-Soviet 
states like Moldova. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014 in response to Ukraine’s 
perceived Western pivot illustrates how impactful such decisions can be. To prevent 
former Soviet republics like Moldova from inalterably moving toward a Western 
trajectory, the use of directed influence campaigns in the information space of Moldova 
aims to sway the orientation of the country in Russia’s favor.  
Moldova is often forgotten when considering the power struggle between the 
West and the Russian Federation. Situated as a landlocked part of Eastern Europe’s Black 
Sea region, Moldova is a small developing country rife with weak governance and a 
stagnant economy stuck between the influence of Russia and the West. Moldova’s 
current government is split on its intent to join the rest of Europe as an eventual EU 
member. However, unlike post-Soviet republics in the Baltics, Moldova has not 
benefitted from attempting capitalism or democracy as hoped. Many Moldovans 
remember a time when they were part of a larger power that gave them stability in their 
daily lives. As a post-Soviet republic and former vestige of the earlier Russian empire, 






Moldova remains significant. On the surface, Moldova appears to demonstrate 
vulnerabilities that might make it susceptible to Russian active measures. The literature 
illustrates clear patterns of Russian influence operations in Eastern Europe. One 
trademark example is the use of anti-Western narratives in Russian controlled media. 
Unlike most of Europe, less scholarly research and analysis are available regarding 
Russian influence campaigns in Moldova, leaving questions about how Moldova 
compares to Russian influence observed in other Eastern European states. Does Russia 
treat Moldova similarly to other Eastern European states? One way to begin to answer 
this question is to examine, How do anti-Western themes in Russian sponsored media 
in Moldova compare to Russian master narratives throughout broader Eastern 
Europe? 
Examining Russian influence/active measures in Moldova is important because 
Moldova is often neglected when considering questions of Russian influence in Europe. 
Overall, examining Russian narratives provides insight into the Kremlin’s world view, 
priorities, view of current developments, and view of historical events.1 This important 
insight is necessary to predict Russia’s next move and prepare to defend against the next 
evolution in information attacks. Whereas the Baltic countries receive significant 
scrutiny, far less scholarly research exists regarding Moldova’s challenges with Russian 
influence. Furthermore, as a former Soviet Republic, Russia considers Moldova to be 
within its near abroad and part of its “privileged interests.” Examining how Russia 
                                                 
1 Rebegea, Corina, “Question More, But Not Too Much,” in Challenges in Strategic Communication and 
Fighting Propaganda in Eastern Europe: Solutions for a Future Common Project. ed. Dan Sultanescu, 
Vol. 142. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics. (Amsterdam, 







operates in what it likely perceives as a less constrained environment in Moldova can 
lead to valuable insights for Western policymakers when considering Russian influence 
in other areas. Most importantly, identifying and validating Russian malign narratives is 
critical to bolstering defenses and resilience in both Moldova and abroad. Corina 
Rebegea describes the importance of master narratives to countering Russian active 
measures. 
Understanding how master narratives are adapted to 
certain countries or groups within countries can help design 
public information campaigns, as well as more targeted 
educational programs for citizens, local media or other civic 
actors. This will enhance Western efforts to advance more 
resourceful public education programs will require more 
innovative and far-reaching public messaging and counter-
narratives that can limit the scope and reach of Russian 
disinformation campaigns. It may be time for Western 
democracies and Euro-Atlantic institutions to start re-telling their 
story and thus rebuild a shared space of values, institutions and 
well-being.2 
 
 This study seeks to examine available literature from American and European 
governments, NGOs, think tanks, and credible journalism to frame the issue of Russian 
influence in Moldova. The predominant premise of existing Western literature converges 
on the theme that Russian active measures are a harmful practice that undermines 
credible democratic institutions and threatens a free and independent information sphere. 
Although this project’s hypothesis agrees with the theme of existing literature, the project 
seeks to understand how Russia is operating within the information sphere of Moldova. 
Although the author acknowledges that Russia likely leverages its influence in multiple 
domains (economic, political, orthodox church, cultural/historical/language) this study 
                                                 






will focus on the information domain of internet-based media. Furthermore, this research 
study aims to address the lack of focused research on the Republic of Moldova by 
conducting a within case study. 
Literature Review  
Introduction 
The use of information by state actors to make targeted impacts on a person or 
population is undeniable. The Bolsheviks’ use of agitation propaganda “agitprop” to 
foment revolution in Tsarist Russia was identified over one hundred years ago and has 
continued in various forms since.3 Advances in technology caused methods and 
techniques to evolve just as the canon evolved into the intercontinental ballistic missile. 
In the age of mass digital information, targeted information became arguably the most 
compelling instrument for change in the history of humankind. Moreover, information 
can be used more cheaply than weapons of mass destruction and substituted for the 
impacts of more traditional forms of diplomacy such as trade and foreign aid. In other 
words, information makes an attractive instrument to harness when matched against 
better-resourced opponents. Russia today finds itself challenged financially while 
attempting to re-emerge as a world power and challenge the accepted tenants of the 
Western-dominated world order.  
                                                 
3 U.S. Senate, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. (n.d.). Open Hearing, March 30, 2017 
“Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns (pp. 10-29) (R. Godson, 









One of the understood aims of the Russian phoenix is to regain influence if not 
outright control of the states that comprise the former Soviet Union. Renamed Russia’s 
“near abroad” and area of “privileged interests,” Russia claimed the right to protect its 
interests in this area almost as if it were Russian sovereign territory since 2008.4 
Furthermore, “Russia aims to erode public support for Euro-Atlantic values in order to 
increase its own relative power. It exploits ethnic, linguistic, regional, social, and 
historical tensions, and promotes anti-systemic causes, extending their reach and giving 
them a spurious appearance of legitimacy.”5 
This literature review seeks to examine the existing body of research regarding 
Russian active measures in Central and Eastern Europe to illuminate how Russia may 
attempt to influence Moldovans’ views of NATO. Through an examination of 
contemporary scholarly material in the English language, this review will evaluate the 
current body of knowledge in preparation for a focused research study considering 
Russian active measures in Moldova.  
 
Definition of Active Measures 
Professor Thomas Rid defined the term active measures for a 2017 hearing before 
the United States Senate. “Active measures are semi-covert or covert intelligence 
operations to shape an adversary’s political decisions. Almost always active measures 
                                                 
4 “The Economist. “Medvedev on Russia’s Interests.” The Economist. September 1, 2008. 
https://www.economist.com/certain-ideas-of-europe/2008/09/01/medvedev-on-russias-interests. 
5 Lucas, Edward and Peter Pomerantsev. “Winning the Information War Redux.” Center for European 







conceal or falsify the source.”6 One year later, Roy Godson, Professor Emeritus from 
Georgetown University, also provided a definition to the Select Committee on 
Intelligence for the United States Senate. “Active Measures are a term that came into use 
in the 1950s [Soviet Union] to describe certain overt and covert techniques for 
influencing events and behavior in, and the action of, foreign countries."7 Although other 
definitions exist, most modern scholars seem to converge on definitions similar to the two 
provided by Thomas Rid and Roy Godson. The term active measures will be used during 
this research study according to the definitions of Thomas Rid and Roy Godson. 
Limitations 
In 2018, Dr. Alla Rosca identified that Moldova was among the least examined 
cases concerning Russian information warfare; despite being one of the weakest to resist 
such attacks. Dr. Rosca determined that Moldova is, therefore, a strong candidate for 
pervasive Russian information operations.8 This literature review will examine the 
scholarly discourse on Russian information operations or active measures throughout 
Eastern Europe to arrive at possible behaviors that may also be present in Moldova. 
Additionally, this literature review will examine English texts or limited works in the 
Russian language translated into English. When considering the case of Moldova 
specifically, sources are available from regional think tanks and NGOs but do not always 
                                                 
6 U.S. Congress. Senate. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: Hearings before the Senate  
Select Committee on Intelligence. Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures  
and Influence Campaigns Panel I, 115th Cong., 1st sess., 2017 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-disinformation-primer-russian-active-measures-
and-influence-campaigns-panel-i. 
7 Testimony of Roy Godson. Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. 2018. 
Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns Panel. 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/S%20Hrg%20115-40%20Pt%201.pdf 
8 Rosca, Alla. “Media Security Structural Indicators: The Case of Moldova.” Demokratizatsiya: The 






meet the scholarly rigor needed for academic research and have been reviewed but not 
considered for this literature review. Through online research, the author found a 
preponderance of scholarly work describing active measures in Eastern Europe on a 
broad scale, but far less detail on how active measures sought to influence a target 
population toward a specific narrative such as anti-NATO.  
Furthermore, even less scholarly research exists measuring the effectiveness of 
Russian active measures and influence campaigns.9 A dearth of research on measuring 
the effectiveness of Russian active measures holds true for Eastern Europe and Moldova 
explicitly. Moreover, the lack of adequate measures stands as the most substantial 
academic gap for the study of Russian active measures for the community of interest at 
large.10 
 
Changing Nature of Warfare 
Warfare evolves to make use of technological advances that might provide an 
advantage over the adversary. Scholars unanimously accept that information has become 
an evolutionary step of modern warfare. Although Russia has a history of using 
information operations to achieve political objectives, it was not adopted into Russian 
military warfare until around 2009, when Russia secretly trained soldiers in information 
operations. Nevertheless, Russia did not admit to their existence until much later. 
Information operations and Russian active measures are synonymous for this literature 
                                                 
9 Gerber, Theodore P., and Jane Zavisca. “Does Russian Propaganda Work?” The Washington Quarterly 
39, no. 2 (Summer 2016): 79. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2016.1204398. 
10 Rotaru, Vasile. “Forced Attraction? How Russia Is Instrumentalizing Its Soft Power Sources in the ‘Near 







review. Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu declared information to be a weapon 
in 2015.11 However, by 2019 Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia 
Valery Gerasimov made Russia’s position unequivocal during a speech at a Russian 
military academy.  
A new reality of future wars will consist of the transfer of 
military actions in [the information sphere]. At the same time, 
information technologies are becoming, in fact, one of the most 
promising types of weapons. The information sphere, without 
having clearly defined national borders, provides opportunities 
for remote, covert influence not only on critical information 
infrastructures but also on the population of the country, directly 
affecting the state’s national security. That is why the study of 
issues of preparation and conduct of informational actions is the 
most essential task of military science.12 
 
After confirming Russia’s intention to use information as a tool of warfare, scholars 
examined how information warfare is used for political ends. Dr. Rosca again echoes the 
prevailing sentiment about information warfare. “The evolution of information’s role in 
modern warfare has brought about changes in how states understand national security. 
This change is reflected in the existing literature on the topic, which indicates a trend 
toward blurring the line between war and peace and moving conflict into the public 
domain.”13 No longer is warfare practiced only by men in uniforms driving tanks, but 
information warfare is public. Vasile Rotaru, from Romania’s National University of 
Political Studies and Public Administration in Bucharest, reinforces this point by adding 
                                                 
11 “Shoigu: Information Becomes Another Armed Forces Component.” Interfax, March 28, 2015, English 
edition. http://www.interfax.com/newsinf.asp?id=581851. 
12 Gerasimov, V. (2019, March 4). Vectors of military strategy development. Speech presented at General 
meeting of the Academy of Military Sciences, Moscow. Retrieved April 20, 2019, from 
http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/  







that Russian information operations no longer fit cleanly within the military or 
intelligence services but can be supported by all levers of power.14  
In many cases, scholars argue that active measures prevent Russia from 
expending national treasure to enact its will on a target population. Without having to 
deploy troops that can be expensive and politically costly, Russia can reclaim control 
over vulnerable states.15 On the other hand, the cases of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 
2014 demonstrate that active measures may reduce the human and financial cost of 
traditional warfare but cannot stand alone. 
 
Russian Master Narratives in Eastern Europe 
Corina Rebegea of the Center for European Policy Analysis states, “Russia 
believes it is entitled to a gray zone of privileged influence along its borders and uses 
information warfare in order to create dissensions within the Euro-Atlantic alliance and 
erode public support for liberal democratic values to increase its relative power.”16 To 
this end, Western scholars generally agree that Russian active measures attempt to 
promote Russia and weaken views of the West by synchronizing information operations 
toward specific master narratives. The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) 
succinctly laid out eight major master narratives that apply to countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe which are congruent with the views of most Western scholars. 1) Anti-
EU, 2) Anti-NATO, 3) Anti-US, 4) Central/Eastern European domestic failure, 5) Shared 
                                                 
14 Rotaru, “Forced Attraction?” 37.  
15 Giles, Keir. The next Phase of Russian Information Warfare. Vol. 20. NATO Strategic Communications 
Centre of Excellence Riga, Latvia, 2016. https://www.stratcomcoe.org/next-phase-russian-information-
warfare-keir-giles 







history, 6) Ukraine is not a country, 7) Western Russophobia, 8) Russia as a global 
player.17 Regardless of how the message is propagated, each effort can usually be traced 
back to one of these eight master narratives. The narratives provide attempts to erode 
confidence in Euro-Atlantic systems and promote Russia as a natural leader for Eastern 
Europe. Dan Sultanescu describes Russia’s complex approach to promote their ultimate 
goals.   
Russia’s contemporary methods of information warfare do not 
crudely promote the Kremlin’s agenda. Instead, they are 
calibrated to confuse, befuddle and distract. Russia aims to erode 
public support for Euro-Atlantic values in order to increase its 
own relative power. It exploits ethnic, linguistic, regional, social 
and historical tensions, and promotes anti-systemic causes, 
extending their reach and giving them a spurious appearance of 
legitimacy.18 
 
Tactics and Techniques of Russian Active Measures 
Additionally, scholars point out often that Russia does not merely promote their 
positions through mass media, often Russia sends several overlapping and often non-
congruent messages that obfuscate Russian aims while simultaneously obscuring the 
information sphere to sow doubt about the information that people receive. More simply, 
Russia promotes ideas but also attacks ideas in several ways. This pattern has been 
noticed widely by Western scholars on the topic. Dr. Mason Richey summarizes the 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 76. 
18 Sultanescu, Dan, Dana Sultanescu, and Daniel Buti. “Towards a Better Understanding of Anti- Western 
Propaganda & Building an  Efficient Model to Fight Back,” in Challenges in Strategic Communication and 
Fighting Propaganda in Eastern Europe: Solutions for a Future Common Project. ed. Dan Sultanescu, 
Vol. 142. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics. (Amsterdam, 








phenomenon, “Of special interest is the notion that Russia’s disinformation is potent 
because it does not necessarily establish falsehoods as true but rather pollutes political 
discourse such that news information consumers are led to doubt the very concepts of 
truth and objective political facts.”19 The literature suggests that undermining the concept 
of truth in the information sphere can be as powerful a tool as promoting a counter-
narrative. A prime example and case study of how Russia promotes narratives while 
simultaneously degrading the truth can be observed within Russia itself. Overall, active 
measures in Eastern Europe seek to cause dissension among groups united against a 
Russian action, promote fake news to create doubt on the internet as a conduit for reliable 
news, and manipulate interpretation or application of international laws to further Russian 
aims.20,21,22,23 
Clint Watts, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, gave testimony to 
the United States Senate in 2017 and outlined the objectives of Russian active measures 
based on an examination of available research during a panel on disinformation and 
Russian active measures. 
Russian active measures hope to topple democracies 
through the pursuit of five complementary objectives: one, 
undermine citizen confidence in democratic governance; 
two, foment and exacerbate divisive political fissures; 
three, erode trust between citizens and elected officials and 
their institutions; four, popularize Russian policy agendas 
                                                 
19 Richey, Mason. “Contemporary Russian Revisionism: Understanding the Kremlin’s Hybrid Warfare and 
the Strategic and Tactical Deployment of Disinformation.” Asia Europe Journal 16, no. 1 (March 2018): 
101. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-017-0482-5. 
20 Ibid, 102. 
21 Rosca, “Media Security Indicators,” 365. 
22 Sultanescu, “Towards a Better Understanding…” 11. 









within foreign populations; five, create general distrust or 
confusion over information sources by blurring the lines 
between fact and fiction, a very pertinent issue today in our 
country.24 
 
The Vulnerability of Eastern Europe  
Scholars assess that since Central and Eastern Europe is geographically closest to 
Russia, Central and Eastern Europe is most vulnerable region to Russian influence 
operations.25,26,27 “The main front line [for active measures] remains Central and Eastern 
Europe. Central and Eastern Europe are the main targets of Russian active measures due 
to their geostrategic importance to Russia.  
 For many states in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia is a valuable trading 
partner and energy provider which gives Russia a considerable position of strength with 
which to influence economic relationships in the region. Because of proximity and 
advantageous geography, Central and Eastern Europe can trade with Russia more 
efficiently and, therefore, cheaper than other large economies.28 As the largest economy 
and energy provider in the region, Russia retains a crucial economic advantage that 
necessitates maintaining a cooperative relationship between  much of Central/Eastern 
Europe and Russia. Furthermore, Russia views the positioning of Central and Eastern 
                                                 
24 Testimony of Clint Watts. Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate. 2018. 
Disinformation: A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns Panel, 30 March 2017, 30. 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-trid-033017.pdf.. 
25 Sultanescu, “Towards a Better Understanding…” 12. 
26 Rosca, “Media Security Indicators,” 365. 
27 Rebegea, “Question More,” 78. 
28 Dubnov, Arkady. “Reflecting on a Quarter Century of Russia’s Relations With Central Asia.” Carnegie 









European states as a buffer from NATO to the West or Islamic terrorism from the South; 
therefore, maintaining strong influence within Central and Eastern Europe is a strategic 
priority for Russia.29  
More profoundly, Russia shares cultural and historical heritage with the states of 
Central and Eastern Europe that provide additional levers of influence for Russia to 
exploit. Either part of the Russian Empire or Soviet Empire, a sense of shared historical 
memory, Soviet culture, Russian literature, and Russian language are powerful symbols 
often present in Russia’s active measures in Central and Eastern Europe.30 The symbols 
resonate appreciably within the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries, which 
allows Russia to manipulate the past and create an attractive image that emphasizes a 
bond that is not present with the West.31   
 The body of literature available lays out the advantages that Russia enjoys in 
Eastern Europe more than other locations. First, weak institutions and poor governance in 
developing Eastern European countries make developing countries less resilient to active 
measures. Dr. Rosca explains how weak laws allow the media to operate mainly 
unchecked to regulation, which provides opportunities for Russian involvement legally 
and illegally.32 Furthermore, a general lack of media literacy within the populations, 
especially among the older generation, exacerbates the vulnerability and highlights the 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Muzalevsky, Roman. “Russia’s Strategy in Central Asia: An Analysis of Key Trends.” Yale Journal of 
International Affairs, Winter 2009, 26–42. http://yalejournal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/01/094103muzalevsky.pdf. 
31 Sultanescu, “Towards a Better Understanding…” 11. 
32 Rosca, Alla. “Media in Moldova: Between Freedom and Monopoly - Foreign Policy Research Institute.” 








lack of resilience to hostile narratives. Government bodies responsible for monitoring and 
regulating the media are underdeveloped or powerless due to inexperience, corruption, 
and weak governance. Likewise, civil society groups focused on independent journalism, 
or fact-checking is usually either frail or non-existent in many states within Central and 
Eastern Europe.33,34   
Certain groups within Eastern Europe are especially considered to be more 
vulnerable to Russian influence campaigns. First, members of the Russian Orthodox 
Church are considered to be vulnerable due to high levels of trust in the church, which is 
used as an instrument of state influence by the Kremlin.35, 36 Ethnic groups are also 
particularly vulnerable in Eastern Europe. Due to social backlash from the greater 
community of Russian speakers, many Eastern European states avoid eradicating the 
Russian language. As a result, ethnic minorities continue to use the Russian language as 
their second language instead of the state’s official language. By receiving news in the 
Russian language, minority populations are particularly exposed to targeted narratives 
and active measures.37 Lastly, approximately 500,000 Moldovan migrant workers live in 
Russia and send remittances home. The large Moldovan diaspora in Russia makes up 
                                                 
33 Ibid, 114.  
34 Rosca, “Media Security Indicators,” 371. 
35 Pertsev, Andrey. “President and Patriarch: What Putin Wants From the Orthodox Church.” Carnegie 
Moscow Center. Carnegie Moscow Center - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Accessed 
October 27, 2019. https://carnegie.ru/commentary/75058. 
36 Matveev, Stanislav. “Contemporary Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church Within the 
‘Autocephalous’ Orthodox Church of the Czech Lands and Slovakia.” Kremlin Watch, April 10, 2018. 
https://www.kremlinwatch.eu/userfiles/contemporary-influence-of-the-russian-orthodox-church-within-the-
autocephalous-orthodox-church-of-the-czech-lands-and-slovakia.pdf. 
37 Curararu, Andrei. “Disinformation Resilience in Central and Eastern Europe (Moldova).” Ukrainian 








approximately 20% of the Moldovan population. This group is inundated in Russian 
messaging due to their location.38,39 
Besides vulnerable populations, often Russian television programming is more 
popular than national programming due to better production as a result of higher budgets. 
Licensing popular Russian programming can be highly profitable and, therefore, enticing 
for businesses and influential business owners. This model enables significant television 
exposure to a large population within an Eastern European country like Moldova.40,41 
As a way to compare the messages and narratives of Russian information 
operations throughout Central and Eastern Europe Corina Rebegea and the Center for 
European Policy Analysis determined that all the messages promoted by Russian active 
measures in Central and Eastern Europe could be linked to eight major master narratives: 
Russia as a global player, shared history, Western Russophobia, anti-EU, anti-NATO, 
anti-US, Central/Eastern Europe Domestic Failure, Ukraine is not a country.42 
Discussion of the Literature 
One of the most substantial aspects of the literature was a comprehensive 
examination of the methods used by Russia to influence target audiences. Mainly viewed 
as a continuation of the strategy and methods of the KGB, modern active measures did 
not vary widely from Soviet methods but evolved for advances in technology. Much of 
the literature gave specific accounts and detailed analysis of how Russia attempted to 
influence populations.  
                                                 
38 Ibid. 
39 Rosca, “Media Security Indicators,” 374. 
40 Curaru, “Disinformation Resilience,” 229. 
41 Rotaru, “Forced Attraction?” 37. 






From a Western point of view that generally views Russian active measures as a 
harmful practice, the examined scholarship focused on describing the target, methods, 
and objectives of active measures. The aim of such works are to highlight harmful 
practices that exploit and threaten Western interests for the sake of policy and public 
awareness. While considering the greater body of Western literature on active measures, 
articles proposing an alternative view of Russian active measures were not found in 
Western scholarly databases. On the other hand, a cursory examination of Russian 
literature on the topic proposed that Western accusations of Russia’s use of active 
measures were overblown and linked to Russophobia. One article, Vasile Rotaru’s, 
“Forced Attraction? How Russia is Instrumentalizing Its Soft Power Sources in the ‘Near 
Abroad’” was the only article that differed from the rest of the examined literature by 
doubting the effectiveness of Russian soft power techniques against Russian speaking 
audiences.  Unfortunately, the author’s method was mostly persuasive in style and lacked 
empirical evidence needed to measure the effectiveness of Russian active measures.  
Measuring the effectiveness of Russian active measures stands out as the most 
glaring gap in scholarship on the topic of Russian information operations.  The 
overwhelming focus of the literature revolved around counteracting active measures 
instead of measuring them. According to Cameron Watt, Richard Shultz, and Roy 
Godson, a lack of dedicated effort to measure the impact or effectiveness of Soviet active 
measures existed in the Cold War a well.43,44 The difficulty in objectively and reliably 
                                                 
43 Watt, Cameron. “The Proper Study of Propaganda.” Intelligence & National Security 15, no. 4 
(December 1, 2000): 160. https://doi.org/10.1080/02684520008432632. 
44 Godson, Roy, and Richard Shultz. “Soviet Active Measures: Distinctions and Definitions.” Defense 






measuring impact and effectiveness are the largest barriers to growth in this area of 
research and should be considered as a strong need in the future. 
The literature did capture scholarly discourse on the strategy of Russian active 
measures. Disinformation either seeks to promote a narrative, replace a narrative, or sow 
doubt and discourse in the prevailing narrative by confusing the truth.45,46 Though none 
of the experts assessed which was the most effective technique, additional analysis 
examining the differences in the techniques could be helpful. Notably, the three main 
techniques are not exclusive and often run simultaneously.47 
Although CEPA identified eight master narratives within Central and Eastern 
Europe, CEPA did not identify anti-LGBTQ narrative or anti-traditional values narrative 
as one of the significant narratives in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the sentiment 
is wrapped up in the anti-EU and anti-US narratives, no significant discourse deliberated 
on whether or not to consider such a narrative as a separate master narrative. Future 
research might consider examining the question further.  
A third gap that identified in the literature review constituted a lack of focused 
scholarly analysis conducted on Moldova. Generally, Moldova was mentioned in the 
context of Eastern Europe with the occasional Moldovan fact referenced, but the 
scholarly examination of Moldova as a case study was not as common as other Eastern 
European Black Sea states such as Ukraine or Romania.  The Baltic states of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania appeared to have the largest body of scholarly research on Russian 
                                                 
45 Wilson, Andrew. “Four Types of Russian Propaganda.” Aspen Institute Central Europe, April 2015. 
https://www.aspenreview.com/article/2017/four-types-of-russian-propaganda/. 
46 Mason. “Contemporary Russian Revisionism,” 103. 







influence in the information sphere. The Black Sea region also contains a good deal of 
research, especially Ukraine with the glaring exception of Moldova.48  Focused 
examination of Moldova as it pertains to the Eastern European region is the primary area 
that this research study intends to contribute. By examining Russian active measures in 
the Republic of Moldova, better comparisons can be made to Russian active measures in 
other countries to more comprehensively understand the activity. 
Upon reviewing the body of work considered for this literature review, due to the 
similar epistemological viewpoint of most of the scholarship considered, no significant 
disagreements in the literature were noted. Western scholarship maintains that knowledge 
ought to be based on independent facts and that minimizing bias is ideal. Soviets, on the 
other hand, viewed the pursuit of knowledge as inherently biased and therefore a tool to 
advance the interests of the state.49 Russia today is considered to maintain the same view 
about knowledge and information through convenience and nationalism more than 
ideology. 
 All authors reviewed agreed that Russian active measures were a threat to 
Western values of transparency and freedom of speech. The literature review focused on 
Western scholarship, which includes a Western world view bias. Understandably, if 
sources from Russia were considered, differences in framing would likely arise. The bias 
of the Western view should be considered in any analysis of the scholarly work available 
on Russian active measures. 
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One area where the literature diverged slightly was on whether Russian active 
measures constituted a new phenomenon or simply a continuation of tactics, techniques, 
and procedures from the Soviet Union. Dr. Roy Godson testified before the U.S. Senate 
in 2017 that similar activity occurred within Russia as early as the Bolshevik revolution.50 
A long-time scholar and professor on the topic, Godson wrote extensively about Soviet 
active measures in his book, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy in 1984, 
and has since compared Soviet techniques to contemporary phenomena.51 Meanwhile, 
Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff of the Armed 
Forces of Russia Valery Gerasimov both contend that the weaponization of information 
into warfare constitutes a new step.52,53  
Similarly, Western analysts examining the techniques of Russian active measures 
tend to view the phenomenon as categorically new. On the other hand, detailed analysis 
examining the techniques of contemporary Russian active measures seldom cites 
scholarly research conducted on Soviet active measures.54,55,56 The main argument 
supporting that specific active measures techniques are new centers around the fact that 
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the internet did not exist during the Soviet era; therefore, the fundamentally new mode of 
mass communication constitutes a new method of influencing targeted audiences. 
Conversely, most of the academic sources cited in this study advocate that although the 
vehicle for propagating influence operations changed, Russia largely fell back on the 
familiar forms of propaganda to influence target audiences.57  
The examination of characteristics of Russian active measures in the literature 
suggests that Moldova is likely a victim of targeted activity intended to influence popular 
opinion on NATO. Moldova appears to meet many of the vulnerable conditions identified 
in the literature on the Central and Eastern European region. Moldova was a Soviet 
Republic and still carries many of the historical linkages of shared history, culture, and 
language that are exploitable by Russia. Moldova still has a sizeable population that falls 
under the Russian orthodox tradition as well. Furthermore pensioners and ethnic groups 
tend to rely on Russian media sources for their information.    
Hypothesis and Methods 
The goal of this paper is to examine whether the Kremlin treats Moldova the same 
as it treats other near abroad countries in Central and Eastern Europe with regards to 
directed media influence operations. Utilizing Moldova as a case study, this study aims to 
compare specific characteristics of Moldova to the characteristics attributed to the greater 
region of Central and Eastern Europe. One way to examine how Moldova fits into the 
region with regard to Russian active measures is to compare the narratives promoted in 
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Moldovan media to narratives promoted more widely in Central and Eastern European 
regions. Since less scholarly analysis has been conducted on Russian active measures in 
Moldova compared to its neighbors Ukraine, Romania, and the rest of Eastern Europe, 
examining Moldova may provide more insight on how Russia views Moldova compared 
to its regional neighbors.  
First, the underlying assumption for forming a hypothesis is that Moldova is a 
target of Russian active measures and is susceptible to such active measures. Dr. Rosca, 
one of the few scholars to apply Western scholarly rigor to the case of Moldova, 
described why former Soviet states tend to be susceptible to Russian active measures.  
Firstly, [former Soviet] countries are geographically close to 
Russia. Secondly, large segments of their populations lived in the 
former Soviet Union, speak Russian, and are familiar with 
Russian culture—or are ethnically Russian themselves. Thirdly, 
the countries of the “near abroad” are comparatively vulnerable 
because they are newly created states with a limited or non-
existent tradition of sovereignty; they have weak government 
institutions, a high level of corruption, a fragile justice system, 
and a beleaguered independent civil society and media. 
Moreover, and most importantly, they remain in some ways 
economically dependent on Russia.58  
 
Rosca’s description adequately describes not only former Soviet states broadly, but 
Moldova in particular which posits that Russian active measures actively target Moldova.  
Through a within case study examination of Moldova’s media landscape consisting of the 
categories of society, media outlets, media professionals, media bodies, and international 
networks, Rosca concluded that Moldova was not only targeted by active measures but 
unable to effectively identify and defend against Russian active measures.59,60  
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 Civil society groups within Moldova such as the Foreign Policy 
Association of Moldova, Institute of Public Policy in Moldova, and IDIS Viitorul support 
Rosca’s view that Moldova is not only actively targeted by Russian active measures but 
impacted by Russian messaging. Interestingly, the three organizations also agree that 
Russian messaging in Moldova is especially prevalent in social media, television 
broadcasts, and internet news.61,62,63 Generally, all three groups invest some effort into 
the identification of malign foreign threats to Moldova’s information sphere; however, 
the main focus of all three civil society groups is to advocate for conditions to build 
resilience to such activity. Nonetheless, Victoria Bucataru, the former director of the 
Foreign Policy Association is quite clear on her stance,  
“[Moldova’s] vulnerability became clear when foreign actors 
started to aggressively exploit this openness to influence public 
opinion. By creating parallel realities and employing deceiving 
narratives—whether situational or strategic, external actors have 
sought to control, manipulate, and increasingly, disrupt the 
existing order in Moldova.”64  
 
As a result of indications from reputable civil society groups that Russia conducts active 
measures within Moldova, this study proceeds under the assumption that Russian active 
measures target Moldova.  
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Like the rest of Eastern and Central Europe, Moldova consumes a significant 
amount of Russian television programming and news. Moldova also uses Russian social 
media platforms Vkontakte and Odnaklassniki as well as Facebook which are used to 
promote Russian narratives.65 Unfortunately, media literacy is not a prioritized aspect of 
public education or public awareness, and government regulation is weak.66 Outside of 
media-specific indicators, Moldova shares several linguistic, cultural, and historical 
factors with Russia as a former soviet republic and also with the Central and Eastern 
European regions as a whole. Given the similarities drawn between the characteristics of 
Moldova and other Eastern European countries, this study assumes that Russia promotes 
similar narratives in Moldova as other Central and Eastern European countries, especially 
former Soviet and Warsaw pact countries.  
 
Hypothesis: Moldova is targeted similarly as other former Soviet states in 
Central and Eastern European by Kremlin supported Russian active measures. As a 
result, narratives promoted from Russian media sources in Moldova will roughly 
match the Master narratives identified by the Center for European Policy Analysis. 
In order to test the hypothesis, this study will compare narratives collected from a 
sample of Russian supported internet news sources in Moldova to Center for European 
Policy Analysis’s eight Russian master narratives promoted by the Kremlin throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe. The eight master narratives are derived from the work of 
Corina Rebegea, Dr. Martins Kaprans, and Dr. Urve Eslas of the Center for European 
                                                 
65 Nantoi and Platon, “The Case of Odnoklassniki,” 3.  







Policy Analysis (CEPA) as applicable narratives to which nearly all Russian active 
measures could be traced throughout Central and Eastern Europe.67 Through thematic 
content analysis of Russian language internet news articles, this study will analyze how 
closely narratives in Moldova compares or contrasts with broader Central and Eastern 
European narratives.  
CEPA identified the following master narratives present throughout Russian active 
measures in Central and Eastern Europe: 
1. Anti-EU: This master narrative applies to a variety of different messages that seek 
to criticize, embellish, or fabricate aspects of the EU or portray EU as a political 
or economic failure, as an unsafe place, or a threat to traditional values.68  
2. Anti-NATO: A series of messages that promote NATO allies as unwilling and 
incapable of defending Eastern European countries or that NATO is aggressive 
and dangerous, which puts Eastern Europe’s safety at risk.69    
3. Anti-US: Messages criticizing America seek to portray the United States as 
“hypocritical,  oppressive  and  exploitative.” Furthermore, certain depictions 
promote the idea that the United States is a power in decline.70 
4. Domestic Failure: These messages emphasize that corruption and socio-economic 
dissatisfaction are attributable to the West and that integrating with the European 
Union will not address Eastern Europe’s fundamental problems.71   
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5. History: The theme of history works to paint a picture of the past that includes 
Eastern Europe into an embellished glorious portrayal of the Soviet empire’s 
contributions to history while downplaying others’ contributions. Additionally, 
Russia’s symbolic fight against an imagined threat of fascism continues in 
contemporary messaging which portrays Russia as a noble character.72  
6. Ukraine is Not a Country: By exaggerating aspects of history such as the Kievan-
Rus empire, Russia promotes that Ukraine never had a shared identity, and that 
continued promotions of such are unjustified. Furthermore, Russia portrays 
current Ukraine as the puppet of other Western entities such as the CIA and not 
really a sovereign and independent country at all, just a large landmass in total 
disarray.73 
7. Russophobia: In this master narrative, any criticism towards the Russian 
government or authorities such as President Putin is quickly labeled as anti-
Russianism.74 
8. Russia as a Global Player: Most often, Russia portrays itself as a champion of the 
underdog such as combatting American Imperialism in Syria and Venezuela, as 
well as safeguarding the world by fighting terrorism. This message is vital to 
advance the narrative that Russia is an influential world power strong enough to 
protect Eastern Europe.75 
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Data Acquisition  
For this research study, 150 Russian language internet-based news articles were 
queried and collected over 90 days ranging from 01 August 2018 to 31 October 2018.  
The time period of the collected articles is random and not tied to or correlated with any 
specific events in Moldova. The articles were collected by First Media Group, a 
contracted partner of the US Embassy Chisinau public affairs section as part of regular 
press monitoring. Permission was granted for the use and non-attributed independent 
analysis of the collected articles. First Media Group’s criteria for selection of the media is 
based on articles trending via social media at the time of collection that appeared to be 
promoting a Russian narrative.  
 
Data Characterization  
All of the articles considered in this study originated from one of 13 Moldovan 
pro-Russian media news sources or seven Russian news sources reporting on Moldovan 
issues. Russian news sources such as Sputnik or RT with representation in Moldova or a 
.md domain are considered pro-Russian Sources in Moldova. The internet news sources 
considered are assessed to be pro-Russian from three main determinations: 1) the news 
source is owned or sponsored by a pro-Russian entity including Russia itself, 2) the 
preponderance of the news output promotes Russian interests or portrays Russia 
positively, 3) the news source either does not publish material critical of Russia, or 






made by First Media Group and the public affairs staff of the United States Embassy in 
Chisinau, Moldova.   
Table 1: 
 
Data Analysis  
Content analysis was conducted by first translating the articles from Russian to 
English using Google Translate. Native Russian speakers were consulted to assist with 
occasional artificial translation inaccuracies. Then each article was coded/characterized 
by the primary identified micro-narrative of the article. Each article was only coded with 
one micro-narrative, the most prevalent micro-narrative assessed by the author. After the 
first level coding of micro-narratives, the micro-narratives were grouped into 11 themes. 
The themes were then compared to CEPA’s master narratives as indicated in Table 2. 
The author determined that the theme “Western Hypocrisy” fit equally well within the 
  
Pro-Russian Sources in Moldova 
Russian Sources Reporting 
on Moldova 
1 https://ru.sputnik.md  http://russian.rt.com/ussr/  
2  http://aif.md  https://news.rambler.ru  
3 https://eho.md  https://pnp.ru  
4 http://www.kp.md  https://tass.ru  
5 http://www.vedomosti.md  https://tvzvezda.ru  
6 https://vkurse.md  https://novostipmr.com  
7 https://point.md/ru/ https://riafan.ru/ 
8 http://bloknot-moldova.md    
9 http://actualitati.md    
10 http://www.infotag.md    
11 http://wwww.zdg.md    
12 
http://www.allmoldova.com/ru/  
Pro-Russian Source in 
Ukraine 
13 http://esp.md  https://ru.tsn.ua 
 
Table 1: Internet News Sources Represented in 






master narratives of Anti-EU, Anti-NATO, and Anti-US. As a result, Western Hypocrisy 
was included in all three master narratives for tabulation. Instead of 150 articles being 
used for tabulation, 172 articles were considered since those articles labeled as Western 
Hypocrisy were triple counted. The complete data set consisting of the 150 articles, and 
first-level coding is available in Appendix A.  
One example of an article being coded is from http://www.sputnik.md dated 23 
October 2018, “Did the Western Media Turn Moldovans away from Russia, demonizing 
it – Poll.”76 The article claimed that unnamed organizations within Moldova were 
purposely demonizing Russia to Moldovan audiences. Suspiciously, no mention of 
specific organizations were made. In the next paragraph, the article claimed that 
American aid money did not reach ordinary Moldovans but usually went to useless or 
ostentatious causes. The article then referenced a poll taken in conjunction with a French 
company IFop that illustrated that large percentages of French, Germans, English, and 
Americans did not believe their own media sources regarding Russia. The article then 
explained that Sputnik was a reputable and influential media outlet that reached over 50 
million viewers monthly. Western analysts dispute Sputnik’s claim of reaching such a 
broad audience.77 
 The author listed the predominant micro-narrative of the article as 
Russophobia/anti-Russian discrimination based on the title, entry paragraph, and most 
prominent micro-narrative present. However, arguments can be made that the article also 
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addressed Western decay, and Russia as a global player. Nonetheless, in this study only 
the most prominent micro-narrative was counted. When tabulating the results, this article 
was then grouped into the theme Russophobia, which was then nested under the master 






Discussion of Results 
Nesting 
During analysis, the author coded the primary message of 150 articles into 128 
different micro-narratives, which then were organized into 11 themes. The 11 themes 
were then compared to CEPA’s eight master narratives. The themes derived from the 
sample nested cogently under the eight master narratives except for the Western 
Hypocrisy theme, which appeared equally applicable under the Anti-EU, Anti-NATO, 
and Anti-US master narratives. Nonetheless, the simplicity of the nesting of bottom-up 














Unity with the wider Russian world 14
Historical Connections 12







6 Central/Eastern European domestic failure 17 10% State Weakness 17
7 Ukraine is Not a Country 14 8% Anti-Ukraine 14
8 Anti-US 11 6% Western Hypocrisy 11







Western Russophobia 22 13%
Anti-EU 25 15%
Russia as a Global Player 36 21%






derived themes into CEPA’s master narratives speaks to the validity of master narratives 




 “Western Hypocrisy” appeared independently enough in the sample to warrant its 
own theme. The theme covered a wide spectrum of issues that involved the European 
Union (EU), NATO, and United States (US), sometimes simultaneously. Usually, the 
micro-narratives present in the sample articles suggested that although the West 
communicated one message publicly, the West’s actions did not match the stated 
intentions and were illegal, immoral or threatening. In addition to nesting under the anti-
EU, anti-NATO, and anti-US master narratives in Table 2, “Western Hypocrisy” was also 
close to the theme of “Central/Eastern Europe Domestic Failure,” but tended to set the 
blame on the West at large instead of a specific state’s domestic issues. The theme of 
“Western Hypocrisy” transcends borders and systemic definitions to promote the idea the 
greater Western system is not what it seems, and conversely, Russia is a more reliable 
partner. 
Western Hypocrisy is a broadly applicable theme and unique enough for 
consideration as a separate master narrative. Unfortunately, active measures are 
intentionally blurry to obscure intent and responsibility of the actor. By remaining 
difficult to detect and define, active measures are difficult to counteract. Since active 
measures themselves are challenging to define, understanding their objectives can also be 






narrative, deconflicting definitions is the first step toward determining whether Western 
Hypocrisy is in fact exceptional enough to warrant inclusion as a separate master 
narrative. 
 
Russia as a Global Player 
During the conduct of content analysis, the most recurring master narrative 
present in the sample was the master narrative, “Russia as a global player,” which 
appeared in 21% of the sample. Promoting Russia as a world leader may be an 
emphasized narrative intended to displace Moldova’s European trajectory. Pro-Russian 
President Igor Dodon defeated pro-European candidate Maia Sandu elected in late 2016 
on a platform of balancing foreign policy between the European Union and Russia. 
Russia established itself as an alternative power and leader in the region and needs to 
continue portraying the same image. During content analysis two themes appeared in the 
sample to nest under Russia as a global player master narrative seamlessly. First, 
“Russian leadership” appeared most frequently followed by “Unity with the wider 
Russian world.” The Russian leadership theme revolved around messages indicating that 
Russia was the natural leader of the region and naturally represented the issues of the 
region to the world.  
Second, the Russian leadership theme depicted messages about what Russia was 
doing in response to Moldovan issues. Further examination noted that the validity of the 
claims made in the articles was dubious or unverified.  Furthermore, “Unity with the 
wider Russian World” consisted of messages that sought to link Moldova with the other 






countries were naturally aligned. Overall the preponderance of “Russia as a Global 
Player” appears to be an indication of Russia’s priority narrative for Moldova.  
 
Anti-Ukraine vs. Ukraine is not a Country 
Interestingly, in Moldova, the theme of, “Ukraine is not a Country” did not 
resonate in the sample. Nonetheless, “Anti-Ukraine” narratives were present in 8% of the 
sample. Most of the articles depicted messages emphasizing that the Ukrainian 
government was violent, unreasonable, and brash; as a result, the Ukrainian authorities’ 
actions were having adverse effects on the environment and regional relationships. 
Additionally, articles categorized as anti-Ukraine blamed Ukraine for breaking up 
historical and beneficial relations with Russia such as in the church and trade. These 
narratives stopped short of suggesting that Ukraine was not a country. One consideration 
is that such a narrative might be too intense for Moldova, who likely sees itself as similar 
to Ukraine and might reject the notion. Additionally, the idea of Moldova not being a real 
country is often brought up by Romanian unionists who seek to rejoin Moldova to 
Romania. Promoting the theme might work against Russian interests in Moldova.   
 
State Weakness vs. Central/Eastern European Domestic Weakness 
Content analysis derived a theme of “State weakness,” which represented articles 
depicting Moldova’s inability to safeguard its people or unchecked corruption. Such 
articles were present in 10% of the sample. The messages were likely intended to criticize 
the pro-European government ahead of parliamentary elections expected in late 2018. 






narrative, “Central/Eastern European Domestic Weakness.”  The label State weakness 
should be considered as a more succinct yet more encompassing way to describe, 
“Central/Eastern European Domestic Weakness.” State weaknesses do not limit the focus 
to domestic issues alone. For example, criticizing a state’s inability to secure 
advantageous international deals would be an example of state weakness, but not 
necessarily an example of Central/Eastern European Domestic Weakness. Overall the 
theme of “state weakness” and master narrative of Central/Eastern European Domestic 
Weakness was almost entirely synonymous, which serves as another validating data point 
for the use of CEPA’s master narratives as a helpful model by which to examine 
narratives in Central and Eastern Europe.  
 
No Anti-US Theme? 
Although anti-EU and anti-NATO narratives were explicitly present in the 
sample, anti-US narratives, by contrast, were implicitly represented. In the analysis, 
“Western Hypocrisy” as a theme was counted for in ant-US master narrative due to the 
applicability and similarities. Although the sample mainly portrayed the United States as 
a threatening and harmful entity, the message was not promoted as the primary theme, 
but rather a second supporting theme. Content analysis during this research study focused 
on more direct and explicit narratives. Going forward, if content analysis were conducted 
again, implicit messages should be coded and considered as well. It would be inaccurate 
to state a lack of anti-US rhetoric in the sample, but this method did not capture the 






It is also possible that anti-US rhetoric simply was not as prevalent in the random 
sample of articles collected for this study. Moreover, the relative acceptance of the 
United States as a strategic partner and source of development aid, attacking the United 
States, could be risky for Moldovan media sources. First, the United States Government 
funds independent media outlets in Moldova in order to promote freedom of press and 
counter oligarchical control of media ownership in Moldova. As a result, sustained 
explicit anti-US narratives would likely attract unwanted scrutiny of media sources 
funded by the United States or applying for funding from the United States. Second, the 
United States can draw attention and refute poorly substantiated narratives which may 
expose the originating sources as less credible. Third, Russia may perceive a more 
imminent threat from Moldova’s association with the European Union and NATO and 
therefore prioritizes those narratives over anti-US narratives in Moldova.78 Overall, 
despite a lack of explicit narratives counted in this study, it would be inaccurate to 
portray that no anti-US sentiment exists in the Russian narratives promoted in Moldova.  
 
Summary 
Overall, the research conducted in this study found correlation between narratives 
present in the sample of Moldovan internet-based news articles examined in this study 
with eight Russian master narratives presented by Corina Rebegea of CEPA. From the 
sample of Moldovan internet news, every single article linked to one of eight master 
narratives. The least correlated master narrative was Anti-US, which still linked to 11 
articles or 6% of the total sample, which is still compelling since 6% of the modified 
                                                 






sample of 172 articles meant that 11 articles linked to a single master narrative. Eleven 
articles supporting one master narrative as the lowest correlation still illustrates a targeted 
effort to promote the master narrative as opposed to being explained as mere coincidence. 
Conversely, 21% of the sample correlated with the master narrative “Russia as a Global 
Player” which is significant.  
As a result, the findings of this study make two conclusions. First, that Moldova is 
targeted by Russian active measures in much the same way as other Central and Eastern 
European countries. Second, CEPA’s master narratives model appears to be a valid and 
helpful tool in examining Russian active measures in Moldova. Furthermore, small 
exceptions noted above may prompt further examination or lead to discussion on 
adapting CEPA’s master narratives in order to improve the narratives model overall.  
One drawback identified in this study was the limited tabulation of micro-
narratives within the articles. This study coded a single micro-narrative for each article 
considered, but future research should incorporate methods to account for all micro-
narratives present in the sample in order to create a more comprehensive result. Although 
this study contributes only a small and narrowly focused contribution to the greater body 
of research, it does provide a dedicated focus on the case of Moldova which is lacking in 
Western scholarly attention.  
 
Conclusion 
 Despite technological advances, Russia still seeks to use information as a weapon 
to divide, confuse, and rally the sentiments of those under its perceived sphere of 






modern mass communication, the intentions of Russian active measures have not. As the 
phoenix rises from the ashes of the Soviet Union, Russia no longer hides the fact that 
information is a logical extension of warfare. Information operations can be used to 
exploit freedom and transparency inherent in democracies to create significantly harmful 
effects. Burgeoning democracies in Eastern and Central Europe are especially at risk. Not 
only does Russia aim to exert control over its “privileged interests” within the “near 
abroad” but the fragile developing democracies have the most institutional vulnerabilities 
and least resilience to harmful Russian messaging. The former Soviet Republic of 
Moldova is a prime example of an Eastern European state particularly at risk for Russian 
active measures.  
As Russia demonstrates a significant capacity to interfere in the democratic and 
sovereign processes of other nations via information operations, increased attention has 
been placed on identifying and understanding the phenomenon of contemporary Russian 
active measures in order to counter them and build resilience. Methods of influencing 
audiences are evolving at the rate of technology and must be continuously monitored in 
order to effectively identify and counter the activity.  The gravity of the problem cannot 
be understated. 
As disinformation efforts intensify, diversify and become more 
insidious, our speed in recognizing, labeling and shielding 
ourselves from these attacks will be critical for rebuilding 
Western information (and societal) resilience. Greater public 
understanding of disinformation can help citizens become more 
careful and responsible consumers of information in the digital 
domain and key stakeholders in pushing back against malicious 
attempts to undermine societies.79 
 
                                                 






In an effort to better understand the narratives produced from Russian active 
measures, Corina Rebegea presented the Center for European Policy Analysis’s work on 
the development of Russian master narratives present in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Rebegea and CEPA posited that nearly all narratives present in Central and European 
could be traced to one of the eight master narratives that Russia promoted. The concept 
provided a model by which researchers could interpret Russian narratives in order to 
understand intentions and priorities.  
Moldova is a case that is often included with Eastern Europe with regards to 
intuitional development and post-soviet characteristics. Nonetheless, not much Western 
scholarly research exists devoted to the case of Moldova to fully substantiate such claims. 
As a test of CEPA’s master narrative model, this research compared a sample of internet 
news articles from pro-Russian sources to the eight master narratives. Overall the study 
found that Russian narratives in Moldova fit compellingly into the eight master narratives 
with minor exceptions and outliers.  
The implications for the research study are twofold: first, the eight master 
narratives were further validated as a useful model with which to examine Russian 
narratives in Central and Eastern Europe. Secondly, the study characterized the case of 
Moldova through a small qualitative study in order to better understand how Moldova is 
understood by Russia and what narratives Russia prioritizes in Moldova.  
 The study presents a logical follow on research opportunity. New research could 
examine the prioritization of Russian narratives in Moldova which may help to better 






Russia views its own popularity and status within the minds of Moldovans and the 
broader post-Soviet world.  
 Overall, the study reminds the world that Russia seeks to increase its relative 
power by gaining influence and control over states in its periphery. Active measures are a 
key component of Russia’s strategy.  If established institutions and states do not continue 
to prioritize the identification, examination, and countering of Russian active measures, 
then Russia’s relative power can increase and the West will be unable to arm Eastern 
Europe to combat Russia’s malignant influence let alone protect its own states’ national 
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